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Biodiversity offsets are proliferating globally, and are 
commonly offered or required in a development context 
to address residual impacts on biodiversity. Regulatory 
requirements for mitigating or offsetting ecological harm 
are now commonplace, with more than 60 countries having 
introduced relevant policies (ten Kate and Crowe, 2014; 
Madsen, Carroll and Moore Brands, 2010). Biodiversity 
offsets are commonly framed in policy as opportunities to 
reconcile the competing interests of economic development 
and environmental protection, and are also viewed as a 
crucial means of internalising environmental costs and 
achieving conservation goals. On the other hand, a mismatch 
in certainty between the guaranteed losses from development 
activity in exchange for uncertain gains for the public interest 
in  nature creates significant risk, exacerbat-
ed by often poor compliance, poor 
ecological outcomes and often superficial 
analysis of exchanges (Pilgrim et al., 2013). 
Of concern is their preponderance as a 
tool in a context of limited policy and 
weak evaluation. To safeguard biodiversity, 
New Zealand must manage their risks and 
maximise their benefits, and this article 
considers how that might be achieved.
Biodiversity offsets are one step in the 
mitigation hierarchy, which comprises 
the steps ‘avoid’, ‘remedy’ and ‘mitigate’, 
followed by ‘offset’ and ‘compensation’, and 
requires each lower stage to be completed 
as far as feasible before the next stage is 
attempted, thereby creating a hierarchy 
of preference (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2010). Although the terminology varies 
around the world, biodiversity offsets can 
generally be defined as:
measurable conservation outcomes 
resulting from actions designed to 
compensate for significant residual 
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adverse biodiversity impacts 
arising from project development 
after appropriate prevention and 
mitigation measures have been taken. 
The goal of biodiversity offsets is to 
achieve no net loss and preferably a 
net gain of biodiversity on the ground 
with respect to species composition, 
habitat structure and ecosystem 
function and people’s use and cultural 
values associated with biodiversity. 
(Business and Biodiversity Offests 
Programme, 2012)
New Zealand has taken up the 
concept of biodiversity offsets with some 
enthusiasm, enthusiasm which almost 
entirely preceded a policy context for such 
decisions. There is a growing body of case 
law, numerous subnational instruments, 
and the government’s recently-released, 
non-statutory Guidance on Good Practice 
Biodiversity Offsetting, yet none truly 
mandate the practice. Biodiversity offsets 
are contemplated in different ways within 
the Resource Management Act 1991 
(RMA) regime (although not explicitly 
within the act itself) and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ 
Act). They also have some relevance 
under the Conservation Act 1987 and the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991. Biodiversity 
offsets are negotiated separately under 
different legislation in the absence of an 
integrated consenting mechanism.
The EEZ Act is relatively new and does 
not contain specific guidance on biodiversity 
offsetting. Signals from consenting processes 
to date indicate that RMA jurisprudence 
is likely to provide substantial guidance in 
decision-making (for example, in the case 
of Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd). Under 
the Crown Minerals Act 1991, biodiversity 
offsets have been contemplated with respect 
to access arrangements, generally for mining 
activities. 
The Department of Conservation 
contends that under the Conservation 
Act 1987 offsets are not permissible to 
address residual impacts of activities 
undertaken on conservation land (New 
Zealand Government, 2014). However, 
evasion of a hard line ‘no’ to activities 
with significant impacts is possible via a 
land swap being arranged. A land swap 
is where an existing area of conservation 
land with stewardship land status is 
handed to a private entity in exchange 
for an addition of private land to the 
conservation estate. The statutory test for 
such exchanges is that the exchange must 
enhance the conservation value of land 
managed by the department and achieve 
the purpose of the Conservation Act. 
Such exchanges have sometimes attracted 
criticism (for example, the Crystal Valley 
swap to enable a ski field extension) 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2013), and the exchange 
of part of the Ruahine Range to enable 
the Ruataniwha Dam is presently facing 
judicial review. There are no clear policies 
for addressing the complex exchange 
of values that must be considered for 
anything more than a very simple 
arrangement, which probably reflects the 
exchange provision’s genesis as essentially 
a boundary adjustment provision. 
This article primarily focuses on the 
use of biodiversity offsets under the RMA, 
via regional policy statements, regional 
plans and district plans. After some 
years of ambiguity, the Environment 
Court distinguished mitigation, offsets 
and compensation from one another 
under the act. ‘Mitigation’ is any action 
that directly addresses environmental 
damage within the impact footprints; 
offsets are explicitly calculated positive 
actions undertaken outside the direct 
impact footprint. Compensation is any 
positive offering from a development 
proponent that does not meet the other 
two definitions (Royal Forest and Bird 
Protection Society v Buller District Council 
at [72]-[76]). While the article primarily 
focuses on biodiversity offsets, it is 
worth noting that often these activities 
are combined as ‘packages’, so may not 
be cleanly distinguished in practice. 
The most common policy setting for 
biodiversity offsets is regional policy and 
planning. Second-generation planning 
instruments under the RMA commonly 
identify biodiversity offsets as a tool to 
address residual impacts of development.
Risks of biodiversity offsets
The risks of trading off biodiversity 
values are manifold and much 
discussed in the scientific, legal and 
planning literature (Business and 
Biodiversity Offests Programme, 2010; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010; Maron, 
Gordon et al., 2012; Linterman, 2014). 
Here we present a digest of the risks for 
the sake of brevity. Risks fall into three 
key categories: (1) that offsetting will be 
used in cases where avoidance is most 
appropriate or necessary to safeguard 
biodiversity; (2) that the exchange will 
not be at least equivalent, which will 
both cause and obscure losses; and (3) 
that the positive actions will fail, through 
either non-compliance (the proponent 
does not carry out required tasks) or a 
lack of success with the method used 
(for example, plants will die or another 
restoration technique won’t work).
A primary concern about biodiversity 
offsets is that they may be used when 
they are inappropriate. Offsets applied 
to irreplaceable biodiversity values will 
result in certain loss. Recognising offset 
limitations is crucial, and often where 
policy-based gateway tests do not perform 
well. Policy must direct when and where 
offsets may be considered and take full 
account of the implications of both 
providing for them and vetoing them. 
The second key risk is that the values 
lost to development compared with the 
values gained in the offset will not be at 
least equivalent. Losses can occur over 
a number of dimensions, such as space, 
Losses and gains that are not equivalent 
across space lead to a net reduction 
in habitat availability, cause habitat 
fragmentation and disrupt ecological 
processes.
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type and time. Losses and gains that 
are not equivalent across space lead to 
a net reduction in habitat availability, 
cause habitat fragmentation and disrupt 
ecological processes. Offsets that create or 
restore one type of biodiversity where a 
different type is destroyed will always result 
in net loss of the original values, irrespective 
of the magnitude or importance of the 
gain that may be promised. And finally, a 
lack of equivalency in time tends to result 
from losses being upfront and certain (i.e. 
the development proceeds) and gains from 
long-term endeavours being both uncertain 
and distant (Salzman and Ruhl, 2002).      
Nature does not invite easy accounting. 
Implicit in the concept of offsetting is a 
level of assumed fungibility that nature 
simply does not have. Yet through a 
sufficiently low-resolution lens, a workable 
level of fungibility may be identified. 
When combined with the need to simplify 
complex exchanges to a point where they 
can be understood by decision-makers, 
the likelihood of inappropriate application 
of this tool increases. For example, a 
policy framework that enables ‘like for 
like’ exchanges within a broad-scale 
environment type such as ‘forest’, without 
accounting for the differences between 
different forest ecosystems, will obscure 
the loss of many important values.
The third key risk is that the promised 
gains will not materialise. A lack of success 
can be due to a failure of method (the 
offset is not actually feasible or failed 
unexpectedly) or a failure to undertake 
required actions, or both. Uncertainty 
generated from a lack of understanding of 
biodiversity can be significant, and there 
is often significant pressure to approve 
conservation projects of indeterminate 
value or feasibility. This risk is exacerbated 
by the low monitoring and enforcement 
effort applied to following up such 
mechanisms (Brown, Clarkson et al., 
2013). Uncertain governance arrangements 
also means that the risk offset mechanisms 
pose is exacerbated. Concern about the 
administration of the concept tends to 
match concerns about its technical aspects 
(Burgin, 2008; Walker et al., 2009)
Benefits to biodiversity
Notwithstanding the risks, there are 
potential benefits of biodiversity offsets. 
Lessening the impact of development 
through requiring adherence to the 
mitigation hierarchy and mandating 
internalisation of common externalities 
(biodiversity loss) has been hailed as a 
major contribution of biodiversity offsets 
(Ecosystem Markets Task Force, 2013). 
As an extension of the ability to leverage 
conservation activity, the potential for 
mitigation and offset requirements 
to marshal resources to achieve wider 
conservation goals has not gone unnoticed 
(Gillespie, 2012). Biodiversity offsets are 
also recognised as tools to channel resources 
into landscape-scale conservation which 
complements the efforts of agencies to stem 
the tide of biodiversity loss. To examine 
these proposals in a New Zealand context 
we first consider the denuded state of our 
natural heritage, stemming in part from 
a past failure to mitigate environmental 
harm.
Seven hundred years of human 
occupation have irreversibly modified 
New Zealand’s landscapes, freshwater 
bodies and the surrounding marine 
environment. The uncontrolled clearance 
of more than two-thirds of our forests 
and drainage of 90% of our wetlands, 
relentless and widespread drainage and 
pollution of lowland rivers and estuaries, 
and the introduction of mammalian 
predators have erased, drained, frag-
mented and thus imperilled our 
vulnerable and unique biota (Brown, 
Stephens et al., 2015). The ‘restoration 
debt’ is significant and creates a context 
of urgency and, sometimes, desperation, 
as conservation funding is generally 
static at best. Given the parlous state of 
our biodiversity, tools which promise 
privately-funded gains are enormously 
attractive, and logically so. 
How are risks to nature managed in New 
Zealand?
This section assesses how New Zealand 
manages the risks identified and whether 
those strategies are likely to be sufficient. 
As outlined above, the three key categories 
of risks are: failing to observe avoidance 
where appropriate; lack of equivalency 
of exchange; and non-completion of the 
requirement through non-compliance or 
failure. 
Reducing emphasis on avoidance
To manage the risk of inappropriate 
implementation of offsets, the mitigation 
hierarchy provides, as outlined earlier, a 
series of steps in preferential order, from 
avoidance (don’t break things unless you 
have to) through to trading biodiversity 
to address ‘residual’ losses. Ensuring 
the steps are followed generally relies 
on regulatory instruments requiring 
that the mitigation hierarchy is clearly 
demonstrated to have been observed at 
each stage, before offsets are considered 
for approval. The mitigation hierarchy is 
present in much policy at regional levels 
in New Zealand, but the requirement of 
demonstrating that options at one stage 
have been exhausted before moving to 
the next stage is loose and ambiguous. 
In some present planning documents, 
recognising ‘limits to offsetting’ translates 
to restricting the use of biodiversity offsets 
to address particular effects, rather than 
the more logical application of avoiding 
the effect in the first place. For example, 
in the Canterbury regional plan, effects 
on significant biodiversity cannot be 
offset, but the plan does not go so far as 
to limit the effects themselves. Alternative 
strategies then become mitigation within 
the footprint, compensation, or no 
The mitigation hierarchy is present 
in much policy at regional levels in 
New Zealand, but the requirement of 
demonstrating that options at one stage 
have been exhausted before moving to 
the next stage is loose and ambiguous.
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reparation for the impacts at all, in the 
event that the project proceeds.
Ensuring equivalence
The second risk noted is that genuine 
equivalence will not be achieved. A non-
equivalent exchange is when nature will 
be lost because the development project is 
allowed and an insufficient corresponding 
gain is required or delivered. To manage 
this risk, policies guiding implementation 
of offsets often include ‘exchange 
restrictions’. Exchange restrictions can 
be considered to be any mechanism that 
controls the requirements of biodiversity 
gains relative to the expected losses from 
development. Exchange restrictions may 
limit risk by ensuring that gains are 
equivalent across time, space and/or type 
(Salzman and Ruhl, 2002; Walker et al., 
2009). They are intended to minimise 
risks to biodiversity of the exchange 
of loss (from impact) and gain (from 
offset). 
An example of a common exchange 
restriction is a requirement or preference 
for ‘like for like’ trades (biodiversity to be 
exchanged only with similar biodiversity), 
because of a greater chance of comparability 
in practice. Principled as this may seem, 
the complexity of biodiversity and its non-
fungibility are sticking points (Pilgrim 
et al., 2013; Gardner et al., 2013). Even a 
habitat of the same type in macro terms 
which is managed as an offset will have 
functional differences and may be only 
superficially ‘similar’. Thus, trading off one 
of these sites for another will lead to any 
values in the original site that are not in 
the compensation site being lost (Walker et 
al., 2009). The more unlike the biodiversity 
values of a development site are to the 
corresponding values of the offset site, the 
higher the risk of the exchange obscuring 
losses; and tools for accurate comparison are 
thin on the ground and introduce further 
risks (Overton and Stephens, 2015). 
Emerging policy under the RMA 
tends to state ‘like for like’ as a preference 
and provide for ‘trading up’, whereby 
an area of lower conservation value can 
be sacrificed for a more significant area 
in some instances. For example, the 
second-generation policy statement of 
the Waikato Regional Council provides 
for biodiversity offsets and includes 
principles to guide exchanges that include 
a preference for ‘like for like’. The Waikato 
regional policy statement confines its 
direction on exchange restrictions to 
biodiversity offsets only, excluding all 
other forms of trade-off. Other forms 
of reparation are routinely agreed upon 
outside of the bounds of this policy and 
in the absence of clear limits. This is in 
contrast to the Wellington Proposed 
Regional Policy Statement and the 
Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan, both 
of which require that mitigation, offsets 
and compensation all demonstrate their 
adherence to the principles (excluding 
the ‘no net loss’ goal, which is restricted 
to offsets only) and use this as a basis 
for assessing their acceptability for the 
purposes of implementing part 2 of the 
act. It is worth noting, however, that 
discretion is reserved in all cases and 
proposals can (and likely do) deviate 
from the principles to varying degrees. 
Assessing the equivalency of exchanges 
remains a process of grand discretion 
under the RMA.
Ensuring success
Poor compliance with requirements (that 
is, the offset does not eventuate) is a notable 
and common criticism of biodiversity 
offsets. While negative impacts from 
development occur with surety, providing 
a commensurate guarantee for the offset 
gain is more difficult. Two key risks are: 
(1) that offsets will not be implemented, 
and (2) that if they are implemented, in 
part or in full, they will fail ecologically to 
achieve their stated goals. 
The first risk can be managed 
with robust follow-through and legal 
requirements that offsets be implemented, 
and if they are not, proceeding with 
enforcement. In the words of Gibbons 
and Lindenmayer (2008), ‘offsets are 
ultimately dependent on adequate 
compliance’. Therefore, if the resource 
management context cannot deliver 
reliable gains, then a further ‘layer’ of risk 
is introduced and resources expended 
at the front end of the process are lost. 
The second risk is managed through 
ensuring that offsets are feasible, sensible 
and affordable at the outset, or ensuring 
that the public interest is protected in 
the case of failure (such as by including 
triggers and thresholds and providing 
for iterative decision-making to review 
requirements). 
Both matters in New Zealand can 
be addressed by robust administration 
of resource consenting, including 
having clear and enforceable conditions 
of consent. Compliance rates under 
the RMA are underwhelming (64.8% 
compliant overall), and poorest (49%) for 
requirements with the greatest ecological 
implications (Brown, Carkson et al., 
2013). The compliance rates under the 
Conservation Act 1987 are very similar, 
despite the Department of Conservation 
yielding the Crown property rights to 
users of the estate they manage (Heijs, 
2015). Neither of these data sets provide 
confidence that follow-through is 
currently sufficient in New Zealand. 
Maximising the benefits in New Zealand
Potential ecological benefits of biodiversity 
offsets fall into two categories: (1) the 
potential for offsets to contribute to 
lessening the overall project-level and 
landscape-level impacts of development; 
and (2) the potential to leverage 
strategically important conservation gains 
from the exercise of these policy tools. In 
either case, the benefits of policy tools that 
formalise offsetting depend significantly 
on the inclusion of robust assurances of 
implementation. 
... if New Zealand is to attain true 
prosperity, we will need to ensure that 
our economic aspirations are compatible 
with maintaining, restoring and 
enhancing the environment.
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Reducing environmental externalities 
is recognised as fundamental to sustainable 
development. Biodiversity offsets provide 
a means of requiring compensatory 
conservation projects for adverse effects, 
in contrast to historical approaches that 
have rarely demanded the same. This 
has proven challenging to many resource 
users, accustomed to obtaining access 
to natural resources at little or no cost. 
However, if New Zealand is to attain true 
prosperity, we will need to ensure that our 
economic aspirations are compatible with 
maintaining, restoring and enhancing the 
environment. The use of biodiversity offset 
approaches represents an early attempt 
to internalise the environmental costs of 
development activity. In the future, rather 
more sophisticated mechanisms, such as 
new economic institutions which penalise 
environmental degradation and incentivise 
conservation, may be introduced.
Because of predictable and perpetual 
underfunding, conservation is a triage 
exercise which relies on astute prioritisation 
to maximise the difference made by 
interventions (Margules and Pressey, 
2000). In order to appropriately direct 
conservation funding from any source 
(including for biodiversity offsets), an 
understanding of the state of biodiversity 
and priorities for protection and 
management is needed. A lack of sufficient 
biological data to support this kind of 
decision-making, and indeed effective 
resource management in general, means 
that conservation actions are often not 
targeted to where they will make the most 
difference. New Zealand’s capacity for 
and commitment to genuine prioritisation 
of conservation needs remain small and 
require attention if offsets are to be 
optimally directed (Brown, Stephens et 
al., 2015). As a result, offset requirements 
are usually scattered, disconnected and 
ultimately non-strategic, and, if the funds 
are used by agencies, may not even be 
additional to the status quo. 
Conservation agencies are often 
criticised for financing core work tasks 
from mitigation funding, rendering 
them non-additional (Pilgrim and 
Bennum, 2014; Maron, Hobbs et al., 
2015). For example, Maron, Hobbs et al. 
(2015) levelled criticism at government 
conservation efforts which drew on offset 
funding to meet international goals such 
as the Aichi targets. The authors rightfully 
highlighted that the use of ‘new’ money to 
achieve ‘old’ goals by public entities led to 
a net loss at a landscape scale. Increasing 
concerns are evident about the application 
of offset funding to protected areas – 
such as proposed or approved offsets that 
entail pest control in already protected 
areas, and formal protection of marginal 
areas inappropriate for development 
anyway – and the use by public agencies 
of funds to bolster core tasks in general. 
It is fair to say, however, that if we 
accept that (from a conservationist point 
of view) conservation will always be 
underfunded and agencies are unlikely 
to have enough money to do what they 
need, then it would seem that brokering 
a logical middle ground to provide 
for ‘temporary additionality’ may be 
necessary to safeguard what is already 
protected (Pilgrim and Bennum, 2014).
What would it take? 
Notwithstanding the lumpy road thus far, 
and taking into account the improvements 
that are evident, is it premature to reject 
offsets as being too risky and try to 
erase them from policy and investigate 
alternative methods? It would seem so, and 
it is politically unlikely to occur anyway. 
But to address the risks that biodiversity 
offsetting poses and leverage maximum 
gains, much work is still required. The 
necessary improvements fall into three 
categories: tighter controls on when, 
where and how these mechanisms are 
used; targeting their implementation to 
maximise conservation outcomes; and 
ensuring success through bolstering 
follow-up. This section outlines these 
areas of improvement and sets out what it 
would take to implement them.
Policy for offsets
In the absence of a clear mandate, goals and 
exchange restrictions are generally loosely 
applied and subject to much bureaucratic 
slippage (Clare and Krogman, 2013; 
Linterman, 2014). The weak regulatory 
underpinning of biodiversity offsetting 
in New Zealand exacerbates the risks 
offsets pose to nature and does little to 
enable the potential benefits. Subnational 
instruments and non-statutory guidance 
are insufficient and leave much discretion 
in the hands of local interests, which 
is commonly regarded as reducing the 
likelihood of a good environmental 
outcome (Walker et al., 2008). It would 
seem that a coherent policy context at a 
national level is a minimum requirement 
to guard against their inappropriate 
use locally. One option is introducing 
a national policy statement under the 
RMA which addresses biodiversity offsets 
(Christensen and Baker-Galloway, 2013; 
Brown, Clarkson et al., 2013; Brown, 
Stephens et al., 2015). 
Policy development and bolstering 
scientific information and resources could 
be drawn together to promulgate clear 
national policy and a logical information 
basis for decision-making relating to 
offsets. It is important to note, however, 
that decisions and outcomes are likely 
to be non-uniform even with explicit 
and identical policy underpinning them 
(Clare and Krogman, 2013). To address 
the risks outlined, prescriptive policy 
should introduce: clear triggers for when 
avoidance of impact is required (limits to 
impact and observance of the mitigation 
hierarchy); consistent definitions; and 
clearly defined expectations of outcomes 
(such as no net loss, net gain).
Targeting implementation: making them 
count
The paucity of conservation funding in 
New Zealand is often a key driver for 
approval of projects that entail offsets, 
because the background decline in 
ecosystems is often significant (Norton 
and Warburton, 2015). Most biodiversity 
... to address the risks that biodiversity 
offsetting poses and leverage maximum 
gains, much work is still required.
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offsets in New Zealand are ecological 
restoration projects to correct historical 
or ongoing harm and the opportunities 
are numerous. Ensuring that, where 
biodiversity offsets are allowed, they make 
a meaningful contribution to conservation 
is an area where much improvement 
is needed, and indeed possible, in 
New Zealand. To enable this demands 
greater focus on improving biodiversity 
information and implementing robust 
systematic conservation planning to 
highlight the most urgent conservation 
tasks. In compelling a stronger focus on 
improving biological information and 
enhancing conservation planning, offsets 
may serve to help align the interests of 
developers and public interest advocates. 
Providing resources and support to 
conservation and resource management 
agencies to improve knowledge of 
their biological resources would be an 
important first step, and potentially reduce 
the baseline information that applicants 
must acquire and provide.
However, if biodiversity offsets are 
going to realise their potential benefits, 
far more strategic coordination is likely 
required. A more robust strategic context 
for offsets could potentially be achieved 
through more visible and transparent 
conservation planning at national, 
regional and local levels. Systematic 
conservation planning promises much, 
and the Department of Conservation’s 
implementation of the fledgling 
Natural Heritage Management System 
has helped to kickstart New Zealand’s 
foray into evidence-based conservation. 
Incorporating offsets into landscape-scale 
conservation planning and integrating it 
with other similar activities is likely to yield 
much-improved outcomes over present ad 
hoc implementation. A potential solution 
would be regional biodiversity plans which 
both set out existing conservation efforts 
and identifiy other conservation priorities 
that offsets could target.
Planning for success: follow-up and liability
Ensuring that gains, once agreed, are 
achieved is well supported in New Zealand 
law. Providing an offset requirement is 
enshrined within enforceable conditions, 
both the Conservation Act 1987 and the 
RMA having comprehensive enforcement 
provisions. Fines and prison terms 
are provided for in the legislation, 
and regulatory monitoring of permits 
and consents are cost-recoverable 
activities. Observed poor compliance 
monitoring would therefore appear to 
be rooted not in the inadequacy of the 
law, but largely in the implementation 
gap. There are many tools available 
that can be used to support improved 
compliance. These include ensuring 
that enforceable consent conditions are 
in place, registering covenants, increased 
agency accountability, and more robust 
enforcement. Agency capture, however, 
can significantly constrain monitoring 
effort (Brown, Stephens et al., 2015). 
Nationalising compliance and monitoring 
functions, such as by vesting them in the 
Environmental Protection Authority, 
could provide a fix by altering lines of 
reporting and reducing the potential for 
political interference.
Part of the compliance issue may well 
also be to do with how gains are delivered. 
Developers are often uninterested or ill-
equipped proponents of conservation, and 
agencies are often inadequate coordinators 
of requirements. A third-party model, as 
is common overseas (in most states of 
the United States, permittee-responsible 
requirements are relatively rare), could 
well assist. This may involve providing for 
dedicated entities to undertake offsets on 
behalf of the proponent of development, 
who may be unwilling or unable to 
deliver the conservation gains required. 
This is of utmost relevance in the marine 
environment. Eyed as the final frontier for 
economic development, the fragile marine 
environment will increasingly become the 
subject of offset requirements. It is highly 
unlikely that proponents of development 
there would be capable of efficient 
and effective marine conservation and 
alternative delivery modes will be necessary 
(Bos, Pressey and Stoeckl, 2014).
Conclusions
The application of biodiversity offsets in 
New Zealand is at present generally sub-
optimal and thus likely to be contributing 
to the degradation of natural capital. 
However, without provision for them, 
reparation will be largely absent for 
approved activities (unless voluntary 
impact reduction occurs). Improved 
outcomes could be achieved by:
•	 improving	biological	information	
that informs decision-making on the 
need for avoidance through enhanced 
planning and impact assessment;
•	 investing	in	sound	prioritisation	
strategies to inform decisions on 
appropriate destinations for trade-off 
investments;
•	 developing	a	clear	national	policy	
to provide a consistent framework 
for decision-making on biodiversity 
offsets of all forms, including 
exchange restrictions;
•	 bolstering	attention	to	and	
investment in ensuring that gains 
are realised, using the suite of tools 
available and policy innovations that 
enhance agency accountability and, 
in turn, the quality and reliability of 
compliance monitoring;
•	 investigating	alternative	modes	of	
delivery of conservation gains that 
are more secure and strategic than 
present, ad hoc projects.
Biodiversity offsets, whatever their 
risks, are likely to be here to stay for at 
least the near future. Their imperfections 
and risks are broad and significant, but 
their use must be considered, against a 
backdrop of continued (and potentially 
increasing) development pressures on 
nature. Offsets can be viewed as an early 
attempt to internalise the ecological cost 
of economic development projects that 
The application of biodiversity offsets in 
New Zealand is at present generally sub-
optimal and thus likely to be contributing 
to the degradation of natural capital.
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result in harm to the environment. In the 
future, novel economic institutions may 
well supersede biodiversity offsets in full 
or in part. In the meantime, there are 
substantial policy options to improve the 
way risks are managed, ensure impacts on 
vulnerable and irreplaceable biodiversity 
are avoided, and deliver more effective 
and rewarding exchanges when offsets 
are occur. The time is now to take these 
steps and improve the outcomes New 
Zealand’s offsets are capable of delivering. 
In the absence of these fixes, biodiversity 
offsets are likely to further lock in decline 
of our natural heritage.
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